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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 990880-CA 
MICHAEL RAY ANDERSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 
1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial when the fingerprint evidence 
on which defendant relied for his motion proved inconclusive and 
defendant failed to demonstrate how its absence prejudiced the 
outcome of his trial? 
u[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
1 
clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 
220, 222 (Utah 1985)(citation omitted); accord State v. Martin, 
1999 UT 72, %5, 984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury that 
Mervyn's, as a corporation, could only act through its employees 
or agents and that, consequently, the conduct of Mervyn's 
employees is the conduct of the corporation? 
Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference granted to the trial court in its 
view of the law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
3. Where the State adduced evidence of all the elements of 
aggravated robbery, as charged, did the trial court properly deny 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict? 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss presents a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Taylor, 884 
P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). This Court 
will affirm the trial court's decision u*if, upon reviewing the 
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, 
[the court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). "[T]he evidence is to 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the State." Id. (citing 
2 
State v. Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (I960)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), defining robbery, provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force 
or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or 
knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), defining aggravated 
robbery, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, 
arising out of an incident in which he brandished a knife at two 
Mervynrs employees as he left the store without paying for new 
Nike sneakers that he was wearing (R. 75-76). Following a trial 
by jury, he was convicted as charged (R. 191). The court 
sentenced him to five years to life at the Utah State Prison, 
ordered $60.00 in restitution, and levied fines and fees of $3225 
(R. 197-98). Defendant filed a motion for new trial which, after 
a hearing, the trial court denied (R. 667-72, 685-88 or addendum 
3 
A). This timely appeal followed (R. 690). 
STATEMENT OF THE FAPTS1 
Early on a November evening in 1999, two managerial 
employees of Mervyn's were walking together towards a store exit 
(R. 359-60, 443-44). As the store manager opened the inside 
foyer door to leave and her companion turned back to resume her 
duties in the store, they heard an inventory alarm sound2 (R. 
360, 374, 445). 
The store manager, Ann Majdi, looked around and noticed a 
couple leaving the store "really fast" (R. 362) . Just outside 
the doors, she asked them, pursuant to store policy, if they had 
a purchase. Defendant, very nervous, walked towards her, pulled 
out an open six-inch knife and said, "Go ask her. Maybe this" 
(R. 362-63) . Because defendant did not have a shopping bag or 
any obvious merchandise, Ann was confused (R. 363, 376). She 
told defendant that the knife would not set off the alarm (R. 
376). He kept repeating, "Go ask her. Maybe this" (R. 378). 
Ann testified that his words "didn't make any sense" to her (R. 
371). Pursuant to store policy, she kept telling him it was 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah App. 
1991). 
2
 The inventory alarm, activated by radio waves, sounded 
whenever an individual exited the store with an inventory control 
tag still affixed to an item of store merchandise. Typically, 
the tag would be removed by the cashier with a special remover at 
the time of purchase (R. 361). 
4 
okay, that he could go ahead and leave (R. 378). 
Meanwhile, Sharlotte Billings, the employee who had walked 
with Ann towards the store exit, turned back towards the doors 
again when she heard the inventory alarm sound (R. 445). Opening 
the inner foyer door and looking through the open outer door, she 
saw a man standing outside, looking at Ann, gesturing with a 
knife in an aggressive, threatening way (R. 445, 447, 473, 474). 
Sharlotte also saw Elizabeth Ashdown run outside in response to 
the alarm (R. 445). 
Elizabeth Ashdown is a Mervyn's employee whose primary job 
was to detect shoplifters (R. 396). Just prior to the alarm 
sounding, she had been in the nearby camera room, monitoring the 
store on closed circuit television. She had "noticed some 
strange behaviors" and so began tracking the activity of a man 
and woman in the shoe department (R. 397) . The man was trying on 
a pair of Nike sneakers (R. 3 98, 406). Just before the couple 
left the store, the man turned and directly faced the video 
camera (R. 397, 479). The pair then departed, the alarm sounded, 
and Elizabeth ran to the exit (R. 397, 400). 
Outside, Elizabeth came upon defendant and Ann, who had an 
adjacent outer door open and was "kind of half in, half out" of 
the foyer (R. 400). Elizabeth testified that defendant "[w]alked 
directly over to me, had the knife out, was pointing it toward 
me, and walked back over to [Ann] and he kept saying: XI swear. 
5 
Go ask her.'" Id. Elizabeth did not know what defendant meant 
by those words (R. 400, 432). Concerned for her own safety and 
that of Ann Majdi, Elizabeth focused on the weapon and kept 
telling defendant that it was fine and that he could just leave.3 
At this time, she also noticed an inventory control tag on the 
Nike sneakers defendant was wearing (R. 402, 418). 
Defendant held the knife on both employees for about 3 0-45 
seconds, moving back and forth between them, repeating the 
phrases that neither victim understood (R. 371, 400, 432). 
Finally, he ran off "quite fast," and the two women went back 
inside the store and called the police (R. 366, 401). 
Later, on a shelf adjacent to the bench where the man had 
tried on the shoes, Elizabeth Ashdown discovered a shoebox with 
an old pair of Nikes in it and a new pair missing (R. 428, 465). 
Days later, a detective came to the store to take the shoebox 
into evidence (R. 428, 488). 
Eleven days after the robbery, an investigating detective 
turned a copy of the Mervyn's surveillance video over to Fox 13 
News for public broadcast (R. 479). Within a week, an individual 
came forward and identified the man in the video (R. 480-82). 
The detective located a photo of the man and prepared a six-photo 
array, which he then presented individually to Ann Majdi, 
3
 Later, she described the weapon as a black, folding, 
short-handled knife with a rubber-like grip and a six-inch 
straight-edge blade (R. 404, 427). 
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Sharlotte Billings, and Elizabeth Ashdown (R. 482). 
Ann Majdi, the store manager who first confronted defendant 
outside the foyer, selected defendant's photo from the array (R. 
382, 386, 486). Sharlotte Billings, who remained inside the 
store but who observed the encounter through the open foyer 
doors, also selected defendant's photo. She based her immediate 
identification on defendant's eyes and eyebrows (R. 453, 462, 
474, 487). Elizabeth Ashdown, the security employee who had been 
primarily concerned with the knife, could not pick out the 
perpetrator from the photo array (R. 416, 418, 430, 486). 
Based on the store surveillance videotape, the testimony of 
the man who responded to the broadcast of the video on 
television, the photo array identifications, and the eyewitness 
testimony of the store employees, a jury convicted defendant, as 
charged, of aggravated robbery (R. 191). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on 
fingerprint evidence taken from a Mervyn's shoebox. The evidence 
showed only that the single, almost complete print lifted from 
the box did not belong to defendant. Because the shoebox had 
been in an open area of the store, handled by both customers and 
employees, the fact that a single fingerprint did not belong to 
defendant did nothing either to exonerate or implicate defendant 
7 
in the robbery. Consequently, that evidence was unlikely to have 
had any impact on the outcome of the case. Because defendant 
failed to demonstrate any prejudice, the denial of his motion for 
a new trial fell well within the ambit of the trial court's 
discretion. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that Mervyn's, a corporation, could only act 
through its agents and employees, and that the actions of its 
employees are considered the actions of Mervyn's. This argument 
fails because well-settled law clearly states that corporations 
act through their employees. 
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court should have 
granted his motion for a directed verdict because the State 
failed to adduce evidence that "personal property" was taken from 
anyone's "immediate presence." The "personal property" argument 
is simply a variation of defendant's argument that a corporation 
cannot be a "person" for purposes of the robbery statute and 
that, consequently, property belonging to a corporation is not 
"personal" property. The "immediate presence" argument fails 
because defendant implicitly argues for a restrictive view of 
robbery, while Utah has explicitly adopted a broad transactional 
approach to the crime. Robbery in Utah, as in a majority of 
jurisdictions nationwide, is seen as a continuing event. Thus, 
evidence that defendant threatened Ann Majdi and Elizabeth 
8 
Ashdown with a knife in the course of completing the taking of 
the Nike shoes from their immediate presence sufficed both to 
establish a prima facie case of robbery and to send the matter to 
the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE 
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE ON WHICH HE 
RELIED FOR HIS MOTION PROVED 
INCONCLUSIVE AND DID NOT PREJUDICE 
THE OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL 
A trial court may grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there was any impropriety in the initial trial that 
had a substantially adverse effect on the rights of a party. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). In this case, defendant asserts that the 
court should have granted him a new trial on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence. Specifically, he asserts that the results 
of fingerprint testing finalized after trial on the shoebox from 
which the stolen Nikes were taken constituted newly-discovered 
evidence warranting a new trial. See Br. of App. at 15. 
For defendant to prevail on a motion for new trial, his 
evidence must meet three criteria: 
(1) It must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at trial; 
(2) It must not be merely cumulative; 
(3) It must be such as to render a different 
result probable on the retrial of the case. 
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State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); accord State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 16, 994 P.2d 1237. In reviewing the trial 
court's decision to deny the motion, this Court ''presume [s] that 
the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless 
the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 
P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)(citation omitted). To constitute an 
abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination must be 
"beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
Defendant first raised the issue of fingerprint evidence 
during trial after the detective testified that some partial 
fingerprints had been found on the shoebox but had not yet been 
analyzed (R. 487-88). Defendant requested a continuance so that 
the testing could be completed (R. 546) . The court denied the 
motion for two reasons. First, it reasoned that "there has been 
no showing here that this couldn't have been done before, and I 
do not want to delay this trial. All that could have been 
accomplished initially" (R. 547). Second and "more important," 
the court ruled: 
[T]he best [fingerprint analysis] could show 
is that either it would be inconclusive or 
that the defendant's print could not be 
found, could not [be] identified, or it would 
show that it was a print. . . . I would like 
to say, at best, it would show nothing one 
way or the other. At worst, it would put the 
defendant clearly at the scene, so I don't 
think that's exculpatory. 
10 
R. 547-48. 
After defendant was convicted, his counsel both requested a 
court order to complete the fingerprint testing on the shoebox 
and moved for a new trial (R. 658, 667-72) . The court ordered 
that the shoebox be released and the testing completed (R. 656, 
658, 687). After the results of the testing showed no match with 
defendant, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. The 
court reasoned that because the evidence had proved to be 
inconclusive at best, defendant had failed to show how its 
absence prejudiced the outcome of the trial (R. 688 or addendum 
A). In essence, then, the trial court denied defendant's motion 
because he failed to demonstrate that the evidence was "such as 
to render a different result probable on the retrial of the 
case." James, 819 P.2d at 793; accord Loose, 2000 UT 11 at 1 16. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion because the fingerprint evidence 
satisfied all three requirements for a new trial. See Br. of 
App. at 15. In this case, however, where the third criterion 
disposes of the case, discussion of the first two criteria is 
rendered academic.4 That is, the dispositive question, on which 
4
 As to the first prong, defendant maintains that the State 
violated its continuing obligation of disclosure under rule 16 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, resulting in defendant's 
inability to produce the fingerprint evidence at the time of 
trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (l)-(5) (1999) . But even assuming 
without conceding that the State had violated rule 16, reversal 
would still not be warranted absent a showing of a reasonable 
11 
the trial court properly focused, is whether the fingerprint 
evidence, if presented at trial, would have rendered a better 
verdict likely for defendant. James, 819 P.2d at 793. Unless 
the record shows clearly that the court's determination was 
"beyond the limits of reasonability," this Court should affirm 
the trial court's ruling. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40. 
The record evidence demonstrates that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion. According to the record now 
before the Court, the fingerprint technician was able to lift 
only one "almost- . . complete" fingerprint and several "partial 
prints" from the shoebox (R. 487-88). The record on appeal, 
however, does not reveal whether partial prints can be analyzed 
for a match, let alone the extent to which a match based on a 
partial print is reliable.5 As to the one almost complete 
fingerprint, the record reveals only that it was not a match with 
likelihood of a more favorable result had the evidence been 
available. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 22, 989 P.2d 
1065. 
As to the second prong, the fingerprint evidence was 
admittedly not cumulative, insofar as no other fingerprint 
evidence was presented to the jury and the bulk of the evidence 
involved eyewitness identifications. 
5
 At the end of the hearing on the motion for new trial, 
the court told counsel that "you'll need to modify your record on 
appeal request" in order to supplement the appellate record with 
the fingerprint analysis (R. 674:9). Defense counsel responded, 
"Okay." Id. Despite defendant's appellate focus on the 
fingerprint analysis, however, he has not included the relevant 
test report in the record on appeal. 
12 
defendant (R. 488, 674:1).6 
The absence of a match must be considered in its relevant 
evidentiary context. The shoebox was on a shelf in a department 
store, open to the public and accessible by any store customer or 
employee (R. 3 98-99). Indeed, two store employees did handle the 
box after the incident (R. 428). Recognizing the inherent 
problem with the evidence, the detective testified that "the box 
and the shoes have been handled quite a bit by store employees'' 
and that he was concerned with "the contamination factor" (R. 
488, 509). Under such circumstances, the fact that the one 
surviving fingerprint on the box did not belong to defendant does 
nothing to either implicate or exonerate him from participation 
in this crime. The most that can be gleaned from the evidence is 
that the solitary "almost complete" print on the box did not 
belong to defendant. Thus, the fingerprint evidence could have 
shown that defendant had touched the box, but it could not show 
that he did not. Given the weakness of this evidence, it is 
highly improbable that its introduction on retrial would do 
anything to tip the evidentiary scales in defendant's favor. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court's decision to 
reject defendant's motion for a new trial based on the 
6
 To the extent that the trial court's findings of fact 
imply that more than one fingerprint was tested for a match with 
defendant, that finding is unsupported by the record on appeal. 
Compare R. 687 or addendum A with R. 487-88, R. 674:1. 
13 
fingerprint evidence, was not "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40. Consequently, the 
ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT MERVYN'S, 
A CORPORATION, ACTS THROUGH ITS 
EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS, WHOSE CONDUCT 
IS THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ROBBERY STATUTE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, based on the 
following statutory provision defining robbery: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force 
or fear. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1) (a) (1999). The Information 
accordingly charged that defendant 
unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property in the possession of Mervyn's from 
the person or immediate presence of Ann 
Majdi, Sharolette Billing [sic], and 
Elizabeth Ashdown. and in the course of 
committing said robbery used or threatened 
the use of a dangerous weapon, and/or caused 
serious bodily injury to Ann Majdi and 
Elizabeth Ashdown, 
R. 75. After all evidence was presented, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
You are instructed that Mervyn's is not a 
natural person but rather is a corporation or 
14 
other legal entity, and as such can only act 
through its employees or agents. The conduct 
and activities of Mervyn's employees is 
considered the conduct and activities of 
Mervyn's. 
R. 172. Defendant objected to this instruction, arguing that the 
property involved in a robbery must be taken from a natural 
person, not from a corporation, and that the reference to agents 
in the instruction would mislead the jury as to the correct state 
of the law. R. 544-45. 
In rejecting defendant's argument, the court stated: 
I reject the argument of the defendant that a 
robbery cannot be . . . committed against a 
legal entity other than a natural person. I 
believe that the statute is intended to 
include legal entity [sic] such as 
corporations who act through their employees 
and I decided to instruct in this fashion. 
Otherwise, there would be no such crime as 
robbery against anything other than a natural 
person. 
R. 545. 
On appeal, without citing any authority, defendant renews 
his argument, contending that the jury instruction is incorrect 
because the robbery statute addresses only property taken 
directly from a natural person, and not property taken from a 
corporate entity such as Mervyn's.7 See Br. of App. at 30-31. 
7
 Where, as here, the property was initially taken from a 
store shelf rather than directly from an individual, defendant 
argues that, at most, the facts would support a charge of theft 
of merchandise worth less than $300, a class B misdemeanor. 
Defendant asserts that "it is the act of taking property directly 
from a person that elevates robbery to a second degree felony, or 
15 
In essence, then, while defendant phrases his argument in terms 
of jury instruction error, his complaint in fact turns on the 
notion that robbery, as charged, cannot be committed against a 
corporation. 
The trial court's ruling and the jury instruction are 
correct as a matter of law. Indeed, the Utah Criminal Code 
clearly disposes of defendant's argument. Section 76-1-601 of 
the Criminal Code, defining terms applicable to the Code, 
provides in pertinent part: 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or 
private corporation, government7 partnership, 
or unincorporated association. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999)(emphasis added). This 
definition, clear and unambiguous on its face, compels the 
conclusion that Mervyn's, a private corporation, acts through its 
employees and is plainly a "person" for purposes of the robbery 
statute. See also Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv.. 436 U.S. 658, 
687 (1978)(corporations are treated as natural persons "for 
virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory 
analysis"); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 736 (1990) (corporations can 
only act through their officers, employees, and agents)• 
Further, in this case, it is undisputed both that Ann Majdi and 
Elizabeth Ashdown were employees of Mervyn's and that they were 
first degree felony if aggravated." Br. of App. at 31. The 
State fully addresses this aspect of defendant's argument in 
Point Three. 
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acting within the scope of their employment when defendant 
threatened them with a knife in the course of stealing the Nikes. 
Where the law is well-settled that a corporation acts 
through its employees and where a corporation is plainly a 
"person" for purposes of the Utah Criminal Code, defendant's 
argument fails. The trial court's jury instruction was correct 
as a matter of law. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT BECAUSE THE STATE HAD 
PRODUCED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF 
ALL THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY AS CHARGED 
After the State finished presenting its case in chief, 
defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State 
had failed to adduce any evidence that personal property had been 
taken from the immediate presence of anyone, as charged. R. 518. 
Defendant's argument focused on the incorrect premise, already 
discussed in Point Two, that the property must be taken directly 
from the immediate presence of a natural person. See id. at 519. 
The court flatly rejected defendant's proposition, stated that 
u[tjhe State has at least made out a prima facie case," and 
denied the motion. R. 522. 
"When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close 
of the State's case, the trial court should dismiss the charge if 
the State did not establish a prima facie case against the 
17 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements 
of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1992) (quoting State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983)). 
If, however, "'the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is 
required to submit the case to the jury for determination of the 
guilt or innocence of defendant.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 
171, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (I960)). An appellate court will uphold 
the trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury "'if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inference that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, [the court] conclude[s] that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'" IdL. (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 
(Utah 1989) ) . 
On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to adduce 
evidence that defendant took "personal property" from the 
"immediate presence" of another.8 See Br. of App. at 35\ He 
8
 To the extent that the "personal property" argument 
simply reiterates defendant's previous argument that a 
corporation cannot be a "person" for purposes of the robbery-
statute and, therefore, cannot possess "personal" property, the 
State relies on its argument in Point Two. Within the meaning of 
the Utah Criminal Code, the Nike sneakers were plainly the 
"personal" property of Mervyn's, taken by defendant from 
Mervyn's, through its employees. Moreover, defendant 
misperceives the meaning of the phrase "personal property," which 
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summarizes his argument as follows: 
Given that no-one [sic] was aware of the 
man's presence in Mervyn's until the 
confrontation in the foyer, let alone of the 
theft of the shoes, there was no wtak[ing] of 
personal property in the possession of 
another from his person or immediate 
presence." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1) (a). 
At most, the evidence establishes a theft and 
an aggravated assault [citations omitted]. 
Accordingly, the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence of the aggravated robbery 
charge. 
Br. of App. at 39. 
Defendant's argument fails because it is based on an 
interpretation of the law of robbery that has been explicitly 
rejected in Utah.9 As in a majority of other jurisdictions 
nationwide, Utah has adopted a transactional approach to the 
crime of robbery. See D.B. v. State, 925 P.2d 178 (Utah App. 
1996) (articulating transactional view); State v. Handburgh, 830 
P.2d 641, 644-45 (Wash. 1992) (and cases cited therein) . Pursuant 
to this view, robbery is an ongoing offense. Thus, for example, 
regardless of whether force is used to obtain property, to retain 
property, or to effect an escape, the "force" element of robbery 
is satisfied. Handburgh. 830 P.2d at 644-45. See People v. 
generally refers to all property other than real estate. Black's 
Law Dictionary 1096 (5th ed. 1979) . 
9
 The traditional view of robbery, which defendant 
implicitly advocates, requires that force precede or be 
contemporaneous with the taking. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin 
W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.11(e) (1986). 
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Kennedy, 294 N.E.2d 788 (111. App. Ct. 1973); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). Analogously, 
under a transactional view, the taking from one's "immediate 
presence" could occur at any time during the commission of the 
crime as a whole. See Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 134 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995)(viewing defendant's actions to commit 
robbery as one continuous event); State v. Green, 365 S.E.2d 587, 
594 (N.C. 1988)(applying "continuous transaction" approach to 
robbery). 
In this case, when defendant used a knife to retain the 
property, he was in effect completing the taking from the 
"immediate presence" of both Ann Majdi and Elizabeth Ashdown, the 
two employees he held at knife point. What had previously been a 
theft of store property elevated to a robbery, under the 
transactional view, when the two employees - one of whom saw the 
inventory tag on defendant's shoes - confronted defendant just 
outside the store and he, in response, used force or fear of 
force to retain the property and remove it from their presence. 
See Kennedy, 294 N.E.2d at 789 (upholding robbery conviction 
where defendant displayed knife after theft of clothing, 
reasoning that force used sometime after and some distance from 
the taking is only incidental). 
This Court illustrated the soundness of the transactional 
approach to robbery in D.B.: 
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[T]he Washington Supreme Court [has] posed a 
hypothetical which emphasizes the efficacy of 
our [transactional] reading of the [robbery] 
statute. The court described a situation 
where a thief takes money from a cash 
register with no one around. Shortly 
thereafter, but before the thief flees, the 
owner comes out of the back room and 
confronts the thief. Upon seeing the owner, 
the thief points a gun at the owner and 
subsequently absconds with the funds. Under 
the analysis advanced by D.B., the thief 
would only be able to be convicted of theft 
and assault, but not robbery. Yet, if the 
pointing of the gun had preceded the taking 
of the cash, the thief would have committed a 
robbery. It would be a strange result, 
indeed, if the differing scenarios which are 
based on the same action, the same intent, 
and the same danger to other people would 
lead to differing crimes and penalties. 
D.B., 925 P.2d at 181-82 (citations omitted). The case described 
in D.B. is factually the same as this case. The result, plainly, 
should also be the same. 
While defendant frames his appellate argument as a failure 
by the State to establish a prima facie case, another assertion 
underlies his argument. At its crux, defendant asserts that the 
State charged him under an inapplicable subsection of the robbery 
statute.10 Because subsection (1)(b) appears to explicitly 
address the circumstances of this case, defendant asserts that 
subsection (1)(a), under which the State proceeded, must not 
10
 Defendant raised this issue at trial, though not in the 
context of his directed verdict motion. See R. 336-40. He also 
references it at various points in his appellate brief. See Br. 
of App. at 5, 28-29, 32-33, 39. 
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apply.11 Br. of App. at 32-33. This Court has previously 
addressed and rejected defendant's argument in D.B. , a case 
defendant fails to acknowledge. 
When the crime at issue in D.B. was committed, the robbery 
statute contained only one subsection defining robbery, 
substantially the same as the subsection under which defendant 
was charged in this case. Shortly thereafter, in 1995, the 
legislature amended the statute, adding the second subsection, 
which articulated a transactional approach to the crime of 
robbery. D.B., 925 P.2d at 180-81 (footnote and citations 
omitted). 
The defendant in D.B. argued that when the legislature added 
the transactional definition of robbery in the 1995 amendment, 
it essentially admitted that the earlier version of the statute 
did not embody a transactional approach. Id. Thus, he argued, 
because force was not used at the time of the original taking, he 
should not have been found guilty of robbery. This argument is 
11
 Section 76-6-301(1) (a), under which the State proceeded, 
provides that a person commits robbery if "the person unlawfully 
and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-301(1) (a) (1999) . 
Section 76-6-301(1) (b) , which defendant asserts fits this 
crime, provides that a person commits robbery if "the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301(1)(b)(1999). 
22 
remarkably similar to defendant's argument here, that because he 
was charged under the orginal subsection and removed the shoes 
from a shelf without the use of force rather than directly from a 
person with force, he likewise should not have been found guilty. 
Both arguments turn on whether the original subsection, like the 
1995 amendment, embodies a transactional approach to robbery. 
D.B. answers the question with a clear "yes," declaring that 
"the amendment was an attempt to clarify Utah's law on robbery as 
covering a broad transactional approach." Id. at 182 n.5 
(citation omitted). Thus, while the new subsection clarified the 
meaning of the original subsection, it did not add anything new. 
Consequently, "under a plain reading of the [pre-1995] statute, 
if force or fear is used at any time prior to or concurrent with 
the victim actually losing the ability to control his chattel, 
then a robbery has occurred." D.B., 925 P.2d at 182 (footnote 
omitted).12 Because the pre-1995 statute is essentially the same 
as subsection (1)(a), under which defendant was charged, D.B's 
interpretation controls the application of the law in this case. 
12
 The Court also stated that, even if the pre-1995 
statutory language were ambiguous, the result would be the same 
because "[a]n amendment which, in effect, construes and clarifies 
a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative declaration 
of the original act." D.B., 925 P.2d at 182 n.5 (citation 
omitted). See also 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction §22.01 (5th ed. 1993)("When a statute is ambiguous, 
amendment of the statute may indicate a legislative purpose to 
clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change the 
law"). 
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This Court's clear statement in D.B. that subsection (1)(a) 
of the robbery statute embodies a transactional approach disposes 
of defendant's argument that the State failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence of a taking from a person's immediate 
presence. Where the evidence showed that defendant used a knife 
to complete the taking of the shoes from the immediate presence 
of Ann Majdi and Elizabeth Ashdown, the trial court did not err 
in submitting the case to the jury for a final determination of 
defendant's guilt or innocence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /3 day of November, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MICHAEL RAY ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 9*1924863 
Hon. TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
The Court having presided over a jury trial and motion for new trial in the above-entitled 
case hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 6 and 7,1999 a jury trial was held in this case. The jury found the 
defendant guilty as charged in the Information, on one count of Aggravated 
Robbery. 
2. The facts presented at trial revealed that on November 13,1998 at 1146 East 
Fort Union Blvd., the defendant entered the Mervyns Department store and 
tried on a pair of tennis shoes. 
3. The defendant proceeded to walk around the store with the store security 
cameras following him. The defendant proceeded to walk behind a shoe 
display; bent down out of view then rose again. The defendant walked toward 
the exit of the store and passed through the security gates leaving the store. 
4 The security alarm sounded whereby a store manager, Sharlotte Billings, and 
a security officer, Elizabeth Ashdown, quickly responded to that section of the 
store. 
5. As defendant was leaving a third store manager, Ann Majdi, was already 
outside. Ms. Majdi asked him if there was a problem. At that point in time Ms. 
Billings and Ms. Ashdown arrived and observed the defendant point a knife at 
Ms. Majdi. Ms. Ashdown exited the store and confronted the defendant, 
whereby the defendant pointed the knife at Ms. Ashdown in an aggressive 
manner. Both individuals told the defendant it was okay and for him to leave. 
The defendant immediately fled on foot. 
6. Store personnel discovered that a pair of tennis shoes were missing and that 
the shoebox the defendant was handling had an old pair of shoes in the box. 
Several store personnel handled the shoebox prior to handing the evidence 
over to the police. 
7. Midvale police department was advised of the robbery and was dispatched to 
the store. Police officers took custody of the shoebox and the store security 
videotape. 
8. The videotape shows the defendant inside the store taking the new pair of 
shoes and replacing them with his old pair of shoes. 
9. The videotape was released to Fox 13 news, which ran the tape in an effort to 
identify the suspect. A phone call was received from Sam Gonzales positively 
identifying the defendant as the individual taking the shoes. 
10. A photo-spread was prepared, whereby Ms. Majdi and Ms. Billings positively 
identified the defendant as the suspect. The defendant was subsequently 
arrested on the charge of Aggravated Robbery. 
11. At trial the prosecution presented the videotape evidence, the eyewitness 
testimony of the store employees, photo-spread identification and the 
testimony of Sam Gonzales. No finger print evidence was presented, as testing 
was not done because of the overwhelming identification evidence. 
12. Defense counsel requested a continuance of the trial in order to obtain finger 
print analysis of the shoebox. The Court denied the motion citing that defense 
counsel had previously continued the case and had ample opportunity to seek 
this testing prior to trial. The Court further ruled that the lack of finger print 
analysis was not prejudicial in light of the other evidence of identification and 
that the evidence was inconclusive at best. 
13. At trial the defendant presented an alibi defense and also argued the fact that 
no finger print analysis was accomplished 
14. Post conviction defendant moved this Court for a new trial, requesting the 
testing of the shoebox in an effort to show that the defendant was prejudiced 
by the lack of testing. This Court ordered the prosecution to test the shoebox 
to see if there was a match with any prints on the shoebox with those of the 
defendant 
15. The shoebox was tested and some latent prints were visible. A comparison 
was attempted with the prints lifted, however, no match was found with those 
of the defendant 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
1. A jury convicted the defendant on one count of aggravated robbery. This 
Court denies the defendant's motion for new trial on the following grounds: 
(1) the defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the Court's 
ruling denying the continuance of trial to conduct finger print analysis; (2) at 
the time of trial the requested finger print analysis was speculative, 
inconclusive and was not exculpatory. 
2. Post trial the Court granted defendant's request to test the shoebox and 
compare the prints obtained to those of the defendant. Test results were 
inconclusive as no match was found. Defendant's request for new trial, based 
upon the finger print analysis, is denied as no prejudice can be gleaned from 
the new testing. The evidence is inconclusive at best. 
Based on the oral arguments of the Parties and the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the defendant'Syinotion for new trial be denied. 
DATED this £nd day of March, 2( 
B/TJ^COURI ^ 
Approved as to form: 
^-OavidFinlayson 
Attorney for defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 2*J day of March, 2000 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was mailed/delivered to: 
David Finlayson 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
SLCUT84111 
